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· CRIMINAL LAw-FALsE PRETENSES-PARTNER FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINING
PARTNERSHIP FUNDs-Defendant and another were equal partners in a used car
business. Defendant took in an automobile, paying for it with his own funds.
Representing that he had paid more than he actually had, he induced his
partner to write him a check drawn on the partnership account. Defendant was
indicted for obtaining half of the excess by false pretenses. The district court
directed a verdict of acquittal. On appeal by the state, held, affirmed, three
justices dissenting. A partner cannot be guilty of obtaining by false pretenses
from the partnership; the statute1 in question specifies that it must be "from

1

Iowa Code Ann. (1950) §713.1.
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another," whereas a partner has an interest in all the partnership assets. State
v. Quinn, (Iowa 1954) 64 N.W. (2d) 323.
Direct support in this country on the issue raised is confined to two dicta,2
both in agreement with the position of the majority. One text writer discusses
the point3 and, though also supporting the holding, his authority is only one
English decision which, significantly, is based more on the grounds of practical
financial management of the partnership than on the conceptualistic grounds of
the partner's undivided interest in the funds of the fum.4 The many cases holding that a partner cannot be guilty of larceny5 or emhezzlement6 from the partnership give added support to the holding, as in both situations the courts base
their views on the "from another" clauses of the statutes or the defendant's
undivided interest in all the partnership assets or hoth. 7 But it may be doubted
that the ends of criminal deterrence are served by such a line of decisions. In the
embezzlement and larceny cases, for instance, it is hard to see that converting
the assets of a going partnership is less reprehensible than when the partnership
contract is executory,8 or after dissolution.9 On the same policy basis, there can
he little differentiation between the instant case and one in which the false
pretenses induced the victim to join the firm and place his money in the partnership funds, from which the defendant obtained them. 10 Under existing
2 State v. Grumbles, 100 S.C. 238, 84 S.E. 783 (1915); State v. Simmons, 209 S.C.
531, 41 S.E. (2d) 217 (1947). The former is even vague as to the charge: "Larceny after
breach of trust with fraudulent intent."
s 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw, 12th ed., §1470 (1932).
4 Regina v. Evans, Le. & Ca. 252 at 257, 169 Eng. Rep. 1385 (1862). "Now, inasmuch as, before there could be any division of profit, those expenses would have to be paid
out of the capital fund, those charges [defendant's overcharging on commissions] would be
matter of account between the parties. • • • The act of the defendant was no more than a
misrepresentation, which would be overhauled when the accounts were gone into." It may
be noted that the English statute on false pretenses then in effect (Larceny Act of 1861,
24 & 25 Viet. c. 96, §88) was aimed at "Whosoever shall by any false Pretense obtain
from any other Person• •••" Italics added.
Sir J. F. Stephen commented: "I am unable to follow the reasoning of this judgement." DxcBST OF THE CRIMINAL LAw, 4th ed., art. 329, illustration, n. 3 (1887).
IS People v. Dudley, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 358 (1950); annotation, 169 A.L.R. 372 (1947).
As to larceny between tenants in common, see 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw, 12th ed.,
§1162 (1932).
6Ex parte Sanders, 23 Ariz. 20, 201 P. 93, 17 A.L.R. 980 at 982 (1921); Pierce v.
Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 465, 276 S.W. 135 (1925); State v. Ossendorf, 357 Mo. 366, 208
S.W. (2d) 209 (1948); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw, 12th ed., §§1264, 1282, 1304
(1932); CLARK AND MAltsHALL, LAw OF CRIMEs, 5th ed., §347 (1952). Contra, State
v. Sasso, 20 N.J. Super. 158, 89 A. (2d) 489 (1952). Contra as to cotenancy: Commonwealth v. Bovaird, 373 Pa. 47, 95 A. (2d) 173 (1953), noted in 102 UNIV. PA. L. RBv.
136 (1953); 29 N.Y. UNIV. L. RBv. 759 (1954).
7 See State v. Kusnick, 45 Ohio St. 535, 15 N.E. 481 (1888); 102 Umv. PA. L.
RBv. 136 at 137 (1953).
8 Larceny: State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309, 99 P. 954 (1909). See State v. Foot, 100
Mont. 33, 48 P. (2d) 1113 (1935). Embezzlement: Napoleon v. State, 3 Tex. App. 522
(1878). See Ray v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. Rep. 122, 86 S.W. 761 (1905).
9 Larceny: See Phelps v. State, 109 Ga. 115, 34 S.E. 210 (1899). Embezzlement:
State v. Matthews, 129 Ind. 281, 28 N.E. 703 (1891); Sharpe v. Johnston, 59 Mo. 557
(1875). Contra, State v. Snell, 9 R.I. 112 (1868).
10 People v. Cravens, 79 Cal. App. (2d) 658, 180 P. (2d) 453 (1947).
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Iowa law, the court could have found guilt by either of two paths. First, it could
have followed the view of the vigorous dissent and held that the partnership
was a separate entity, which had the entire interest in the assets. There is
authority for the separate entity position,11 especially in the absence of the
Uniform Partnership Act with its non-entity or aggregate theory.12 Secondly,
the court could have expanded on the position suggested by the Pennsylvania
court in Commonwealth 11. B011aird18 and held that the partnership assets were
divisible, hence the defendant could be convicted for appropriating what was
not his share.14 Either position would satisfy the "from another" test, the
requirement that the property taken be entirely that of another. But it is suggested that both of these courses might only increase the confusion in the title
and possession aspects of theft offenses. 15 Rather, the solution would seem to lie
with the adoption of statutes covering the matter. One type makes such an
appropriation by a partner a misdemeanor, 16 while another eliminates any
defense to larceny17 or embezzlement18 based on partial ownership. Though
this latter type has been interpeted in a hypertechnical manner so as to exclude
partners,19 it is susceptible of a more liberal construction.20
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11 Jensen v. Wiersma, 185 Iowa 551, 170 N.W. 780 (1919); Soursos v. Mason City,
230 Iowa 157, 296 N.W. 807 (1941); State v. Pielsticker, 118 Neb. 419, 225 N.W. 51
(1929); Dunbar v. Farnum, 109 Vt. 313, 196 A. 237 (1937); 13 IowA L. R:l!v. 463
(1928); 15 IowA L. R:l!v. 186 (1930); 41 CoL. L. R:l!v. 698 (1941).
12 MEcHEM, ELEMENTS OF PARTNI!RSIDP, 2d ed., §6 (1920); Drake, ''Partnership
Entity and Tenancy in Partnership: The Struggle for a Definition," 15 MrcH. L. R:l!v.
609 (1917).
13 Note 6 supra. As the latter note points out, the decision can be attacked because of
its reliance on the defendant's status as agent for the cotenancy; a partner has an equivalent
agency status, but is not liable for embezzlement as such. 2 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME §575d
(1946). Contra, State v. Sasso, note 6 supra.
14 The indictment in the principal case may have been drawn on this theory as it
alleged that the defendant obtained only half of the excess and obtained it from his

partner.
15 Beale, "The Borderland of Larceny,'' 6 HARV, L. R:l!v. 244 (1892); 20 CoL. L.
R:l!v. 318 (1920).
16 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) tit. 18, §4835. See Commonwealth v. Moyer, 83
Pa. D. & C. 271 (1952); Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 27, §200. As to embezzlement
from voluntary associations, see Mass. Laws Ann. (1933) c. 266, §§58, 59; Commonwealth
v. Novick, 248 Mass. 317, 142 N.E. 771 (1924).
17 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §622.02; Wash. Rev. Code (1952), §9.54.060; Nev.
Comp. Laws (1929) §10339.
18 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §750.181; Wis. Stat. (1953) §343.20(2). See A.L.I.,
Model Penal Code (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954) §206.11(1).
19 State v. Eberhart, 106 Wash. 222, 179 P. 853 (1919); State v. Elsbury, 63 Nev.
463, 175 P. (2d) 430, 169 A.L.R. 364 at 372 (1946), noted in 32 MINN. L. R:l!v. 68
(1947).
20 State v. MacGregor, 202 Minn. 579, 279 N.W. 372 (1938).

